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WELSH S. WHIm t
Over the past two decades, Yale Kamisar has been one of the
true giants in the field of criminal procedure. As the essays by
Kamisar collected in his recent book, Police Interrogation and Con-
fessions,l demonstrate, his most powerful writing has been in the
area of police interrogation and confessions. Perhaps no other legal
scholar's writings have ever played so great a part in formulating
the relevant questions, in providing insight into the critical issues,
and, ultimately, in shaping the constitutional doctrine established
by the Supreme Court as have Kamisar's in this area.
Kamisar's continuing influence can be attributed to a variety
of considerations. Undoubtedly, his power as a writer enables him
to dramatize issues, giving them a visibility and a meaning they
would otherwise lack. For example, his discussion 2 of the police
interrogation techniques described in the Inbau & Reid interroga-
tion manual 0 transformed the informed lawyer's image of a police
interrogation from one in which the suspect is "interviewed" by
the police 4 to one in which the police extort information through
a series of psychologically effective techniques.5 Similarly, the
essay "Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure" 1 exposed the disparity between a criminal
f Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania.
1 y. KAmsAt,, POLICE INTEROGAION AND CoNp-SSioNS (1980).
2Id. 1-6.
3 F. INBAu & J. REIm, CkMwNAL INTEnROCGATION AND CONFMSIONS (1962).
4 For example, Kamisar notes that in State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d
392 (1963), a case in which the 18-year-old suspect was subjected to police inter-
rogation techniques for six hours, the Court repeatedly refers to the police interroga-
tion as "interviews." Y. KAmismz , supra note 1, at 99 n.3.
5 The ultimate fruit of Kamisar's efforts can be perceived in the nine pages of
the Miranda majority opinion that support the view that police interrogation is
inherently coercive by recounting at length the interrogation techniques described
in the police manuals. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-56 (1966).
6 Y. KKmISAsI, supra note 1, at 27-40.
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defendant's rights at the pretrial and trial stages to public view by
expressing it in an exceptionally vivid metaphor:
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense at-
torneys bellow and strut and prosecuting attorneys are
hemmed in at many turns. But what happens before an
accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of this
veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub. Typically he
must first pass through a much less pretentious edifice, a
police station with bare back rooms and locked doors.
In this "gatehouse" of American criminal procedure
-through which most defendants journey and beyond
which many never get-the enemy of the state is a deper-
sonalized "subject" to be "sized up" and subjected to "in-
terrogation tactics and techniques most appropriate for the
occasion"; he is "game" to be stalked and cornered. Here
ideals are checked at the door, "realities" faced, and the
prestige of law enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves
the "gatehouse" and enters the "mansion"-if he ever gets
there-the enemy of the state is repersonalized, even digni-
fied, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor
of individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated.
7
As this language demonstrates, Kamisar is similar to his arch-
rival Fred Inbau in one respect: both of these law professors are
able to write in a way that captures the imagination of a lay audi-
ence.8 Kamisar has other abilities, however, that distinguish him
from other, merely articulate authors. First, he is a formidable
scholar. Indeed, the depth of his scholarship-in terms of his
knowledge of relevant authorities, including Supreme Court cases,
lower court authorities, and historical antecedents-is so exceptional
that it is almost unparallelled. Moreover, he is able to channel
his expertise so that it bears directly on the critical legal issues
currently confronting the Supreme Court. Combining scholarship
with a high order of legal craftsmanship, these essays focus on the
central legal issues relating to police interrogation and analyze these
issues with extraordinary precision and clarity.
Kamisar's unique talents are never more in evidence than in
his two essays on the Supreme Court's decision in Brewer v. Wil-
liams.9  The first of these essays 10 incisively probes the one im-
7 Id. 31-32.
sin his 1977 tribute to Inbau, Karnisar voices his respect for Inbau's ability to
Teach a broad lay audience. Id. 103.
9430 U.S. 387 (1977).
o y. Kxmrsj, supra note 1, at 113-37.
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portant aspect of the police interrogation cases that the Supreme
Court has never really confronted; the second,1 by illuminating
legal issues that were somewhat obscured by the Court's analysis
in Williams, has apparently led the Court to accept the essay's
analysis of these issues as the framework within which future re-
lated constitutional issues will be decided.
Brewer v. Williams was a murder case in which police detec-
tive Learning delivered the now-famous "Christian burial speech"
to the defendant Williams while Williams was being transported
by police car from Davenport, Iowa to stand trial for murder in
Des Moines, Iowa.' 2 As recounted by the Supreme Court, Detective
Leaming began his speech by addressing the defendant (who was
very religious) as Reverend, and continued as follows:
I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road.... Number one, I want you to
observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting,
it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor,
it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predict-
ing several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you
yourself are the only person that knows where this little
girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once,
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be un-
able to find it. And, since we will be going right past the
area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop
and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl
should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl
who was snatched way from them on Christmas [E]ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on
the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying
to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being
able to find it at all.
13
Shortly after hearing this speech, Williams disclosed incriminating
evidence, including the location of the victim's body.14 The Court
held that these incriminating disclosures were obtained in violation
of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel and were
therefore inadmissible 5
11 Id. 139-224.
'2 For a detailed discussion of the facts in Williams, see id. 113-17.





By closely scrutinizing the record in the Williams case,
Kamisar's first essay demonstrates that Detective Learning actually
testified to two significantly different versions of the "Christian
burial speech." 16 Kamisar provides a skillful and interesting
analysis of the implications of these variations, discussing the sig-
nificance of the discrepancies within the context of the Williams
litigation. His ultimate point, however, is that the very presence
of such discrepancies reveals the inadequacy of the existing method
of litigating issues relating to police interrogation. The facts rel-
evant to such questions generally are developed solely by testimony
of police officers and the defendant. In the likely case of a conflict
in credibility between the defendant and the officers, the latter
almost always will be believed.' 7 Thus, in most cases, the facts
relevant to the critical constitutional issues will be provided by the
officers' characterization of the pertinent events.
In Williams, for example, Detective Learning could quite con-
ceivably have described his "speech" to Williams as merely a com-
ment "that the weather was beginning to turn bad and that dis-
covery of the body and a decent burial for the child might be
delayed by snow covering the body." 1s This characterization,
though not inaccurate, would almost certainly alter judicial per-
ceptions of Leaming's speech. The dissent's description of the
speech as mere conversation"' would be less questionable, and the
majority's conclusion that the detective "designedly set out to elicit
information" 20 would be less firmly supported.
To improve the efficacy of the litigation process, Kamisar pro-
poses that, whenever feasible, conversations between suspects and
law enforcement officials or their agents should be tape recorded.
21
The purpose, of course, is to guarantee that an objective, reliable
account of the relevant facts be available in court. As Kamisar
16 Y. KAMIsAP supra note 1, at 117-19.
17 The Williams case was unusual in that there were conflicts in testimony be-
tween not only the defendant and the police but also between the police and
defendant's two attorneys. Kamisar points out that when conflicts occurred between
Williams and Detective Leaming, Leaming's version was accepted, id. 116, but when
the attorneys' testimony was at variance with Leaming's, "the federal district court
disbelieved Leaming all three times," id. 117.
18 This was how the speech was characterized in the state of Iowa's petition
for a writ of certiorari. See id. 136. As Kamisar notes, Detective Leaming origi-
nally described the speech as "quite a discussion relative to religion." Id. 131.
The content of the speech was disclosed only on cross examination and only when
Leaming voluntarily disclosed it. Id.
19 430 U.S. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20 Id. 399.
21 y. KssssAn, supra note 1, at 133.
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emphasizesi the proposal for recording verbal exchanges between
police and suspects is not innovative; similar procedures have been
recommended by others over the past several decades.2 s But
Kamisar's incisive analysis of the implications of the Williams rec-
ord lends special credence to his concluding observations about the
glaring problems with our present system. If no change is made
in the litigation process, he asserts that, in the area of police inter-
rogation, it may not matter "whether new stories are added to the
temples of constitutional law or old ones removed. For any time
an officer unimpeded by any objective record distorts, misinter-
prets, or overlooks one or more critical events, the temple may
fall. For it will be a house built upon sand." 24
Kamisar's final essay shifts to an analysis of the legal issues
raised by the majority and dissenting opinions in Williams. Jus-
tice Stewart's majority opinion concluded that Detective Leaming's
"Christian burial speech" violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel because the speech constituted "interroga-
tion" of the defendant 25 at a time when his sixth amendment right
was in effect and had not been waived. Although not disputing that
the defendant's sixth amendment right was in effect, the dissenting
opinions argued either that the right was waived 28 or that the
"Christian burial speech" was not violative of the sixth amendment
because the speech was not "interrogation." 27
Kamisar begins his analysis by focusing on the "interrogation"
issue. After examining Miranda and its antecedents, he convinc-
ingly demonstrates that the "Christian burial speech" constitutes
"interrogation" within the meaning of the Miranda case.28 He
subsequently notes, however, that because the defendant's sixth
amendment right is at stake, the issue whether there is "interroga-
tion" within the meaning of Miranda should be constitutionally
irrelevant. In Massiah v. United States, 9 the decision on which
the Williams majority relies, the Court held that when the sixth
amendment right to counsel is in effect, the prohibition imposed on
22 Id. 135.
23 See, e.g., Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of
Crime, 24 J. Cnmm. L. CHMIOLOGy & POL. Scr. 1014, 1017 (1934).
24Y. KAmIsAI, supra note 1, at 137.
25 430 U.S. at 400. At one point, the majority characterizes the speech as
"tantamount to interrogation." It then goes on to specify that no sixth amendment
protection "would have come into play if there had been no interrogation." ld. 400.
26 Id. 435 (White, J., dissenting).
27 Id. 440 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28 Y. KAmisxm, supra note 1, at 151-60.
29377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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the government is that they may not "deliberately elicit" incrimi-
nating disclosures from the defendant. By using a series of aptly
constructed hypotheticals,30 Kamisar develops the distinctions be-
tween "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda and "de-
liberate elicitation" within the meaning of Massiah, demonstrating
that the protection afforded by Massiah is considerably broader
than that afforded by Miranda.
Thus, Kamisar's essay seeks to establish two principal theses.
First, Miranda type "interrogation" must include something more
than direct questioning by the police; specifically, "interrogation"
occurs whenever the police engage in conduct that constitutes "com-
pulsion" within the meaning of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.31 Second, the protection afforded defendants by Miranda is
both different and less broad than the protection afforded by the
sixth amendment right to counsel; the former protects defendants
from government "interrogation" whereas the latter safeguards sus-
pects against "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating disclosures
by the government.
Despite its intimations to the contrary in Williams, the Court
essentially adopted these twin theses in two cases decided last term.
Rhode Island v. Innis3 2 established that "interrogation" includes
not only direct questioning, but also all speech or conduct that is
its "functional equivalent"; 33 Innis and United States v. Henry 
34
made it clear that the Miranda and sixth amendment protections
are distinct constitutional safeguards,3 5 and the Henry Court fol-
lowed Massiah (and Kamisar) by holding that the sixth amendment
right to counsel prohibits "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating
statements by the government.36
There are, of course, important issues that must be addressed
within this constitutional framework. One such issue concerns the
triggering of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Because so
much turns on whether that right is in effect, defining the precise
circumstances under which the right becomes operative is par-
30 Y. KAmiSAE, supra note 1, at 175-88.
31Id. 160.
32 100 S. Ct 1682 (1980).
33 Id. 1689.
84100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
85 Thus, in Innis, the Court dropped a footnote that cited Kamisar's second
Williams essay and specified that the protections afforded by the fifth and sixth
amendments "are not necesarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the
two constitutional protections are quite distinct." 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4. See also
United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. at 2187.
3 100 S. Ct. at 2186-87.
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ticularly important. In Williams, the Court said that the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right comes into effect "at or after the time
that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 37
Kamisar's essay predicts that the Court eventually will adopt some
variation of the New York rule,38 and hold that the defendant's
sixth amendment right will be invoked when it is clear to the
police that a defendant in custody is represented by counsel.-
Neither of these rules, however, appears well-designed to safe-
guard the individual interests involved.40 A notion that the de-
fendant is entitled to the protection of counsel as soon as adversary
proceedings against him have begun appeared to undergird the
original sixth amendment decisions.41  Obviously, the commence-
ment of adversary proceedings cannot be determined by reference
to whether the defendant happens to be represented by counsel. In
addition, to draw the line solely on the basis of the occurrence of a
preliminary arraignment is unduly formalistic: not only is the tim-
ing of the preliminary arraignment generally within the exclusive
control of the police,42 but also the arraignment itself will not gen-
erally signal any real change in the degree of adversary relationship
between the police and the defendant.
Since Williams, the Court has not expressly articulated any
additional criteria for determining when the defendant's sixth
amendment right will be invoked. In Rhode Island v. Innis, how-
ever, the Court implicitly rejected several approaches that appear
more promising than a strict focus on whether the defendant's pre-
liminary arraignment has taken place. After Innis, it is clear that
neither the focus of the investigation on the defendant,48 nor the
defendant's arrest,44 nor even the defendant's assertion of his right
37430 U.S. at 398.
38 See, e.g., People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419 (1976).
39 Y. K.usMs supra note 1, at 214.
40 For the expression of a similar view, see id. 211-12, 220.
4 1 5ee Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). With respect to defining the point at which the sixth amendment attaches,
the Court appears to have accepted the view expressed in Justice Stewart's Escobedo
dissent. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). See generally Grano,
Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Under-
lying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. Cam. L. ~rv. 1, 6-7 (1979).
4 2 See Y. K~ansA, supra note 1, at 212.
43 This line was suggested by the majority opinion in Escobedo. See 378 U.S.
at 490.
44 In one form or another, this line has been suggested by a number of com-
mentators. See, e.g., White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 581, 591-92 (1979).
[Vol. 129:994
BOOK REVIEWS
to an attorney in response to Miranda warnings 45 will be sufficient
to implicate the sixth amendment right to counsel.
46
One as yet unconsidered approach that appears to be superior
to an exclusive focus on whether the defendant has been formally
arraigned would be to hold that a defendant's sixth amendment
right will come into effect as soon as an arrested defendant has been
formally arraigned or as soon as there has been "unnecessary
delay" 47 by the police in bringing an arrested defendant to arraign-
ment. This rule would arguably strike a reasonable accommoda-
tion between the competing interests involved. From the police
perspective, defining the commencement of the adversary proceed-
ings will inevitably be arbitrary because, as Judge Friendly has
noted,48 when the police attempt to elicit information from a suspect
in custody, they might be concerned both with general investigation
and with strengthening the specific case against the suspect. It
may therefore be unduly burdensome from the police perspective
to hold that the adversary process begins at the point of arrest.
On the other hand, although it is obviously impossible to
define the precise moment at which the investigatory phase shifts
into the adversary one, it does not appear unreasonable to presume
that this point has been reached if the suspect has been held so
long that the police could have reasonably brought formal charges
against him. This rule will not preclude attempts to elicit informa-
tion from the suspect at the stationhouse, but it will provide some
additional protection for individuals in that the potential legitimate
45 In his dissenting opinion in Innis, Justice Stevens took the position that when,
in response to the Miranda warnings, the defendant asserted his right to an attorney,
this should be sufficient to trigger the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
See 100 S. Ct. at 1694 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 In Innis, all of these events had taken place prior to the defendant's disclosure
of incriminating evidence. Nevertheless, the Court took pains to emphasize that the
admissibility of the incriminating disclosures was not to be determined on the basis
of the sixth amendment decisions. See id. 1689 n.4.
4 7 "Unnecessary delay" was defined by the Supreme Court in administering the
McNabb-Mallory rule. The Court held that, pursuant to the Court's supervisory
power over the federal courts, statements obtained by federal agents after an
"unnecessary delay" in bringing the defendant to the nearest available magistrate
would be inadmissible in the federal courts. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See generally Hogan
& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1
(1958). Recently, state supreme courts have adopted similar rules. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286, 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977). Unlike
the proposed rule, the McNabb-Mallory standard stems from the Court's supervisory
power rather than the Constitution. Nevertheless, if the proposed rule were to be
adopted, it would not be inappropriate to use the McNabb-Mallory decisions as a
starting point towards defining the concept of "unnecessary delay."
48 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L.
hAy. 929, 948-50 (1965).
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duration of such attempts will at least be reduced.49 Most im-
portantly, adoption of the rule would remove the anomaly of allow-
ing the police to avoid the prohibitions of the sixth amendment
by the simple expedient of delaying the initiation of formal pro-
ceedings against the defendant. Thus, this extension of Williams
would at least limit the extent to which the triggering of the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right would be subject to manipulation
by the police.
The extent of the protection provided by the sixth amendment
right to counsel is also problematic. In Henry, the Court refined
the sixth amendment test by holding that "deliberate elicitation"
within the meaning of Massiah occurs when the government "inten-
tionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce . . . incriminating
statements without the assistance of counsel." 50 The meaning of
this test, however, is far from clear."1 Moreover, in Henry itself,
the majority took pains to confine its analysis narrowly, suggesting
that its rationale would extend only to situations involving the
surreptitious elicitation of incriminating statements by an under-
cover government agent from an indicted defendant in custody. 2
Nevertheless, the Court dropped a footnote intimating that once
the defendant's sixth amendment right is in effect, the government
will ordinarily be prohibited from any attempts to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from unrepresented defendants.
6 3
49 Of course, the extent of additional protection provided by the proposed rule
will depend on at least two additional issues: (1) the degree to which the sixth
amendment right affords protection beyond that afforded by Miranda; and (2) the
standard to be used in determining when the sixth amendment right may be waived.
With respect to the second issue, it should be noted that the Second Circuit has
recently held that the standards for waiver of sixth amendment rights will be stricter
than those that must be met to establish a waiver of the Miranda rights. See United
States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980). See also text accompanying notes
55-71 infra.
50 100 S. Ct. at 2189.
51 For a discussion of the meaning of the Henry test, see White, Interrogation
Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 1209 (1980).
52 See 100 S. Ct. at 2186.
6
3 See id. 2189 n.14 (quoting Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the ABA CODE
oF PRorEssIoNAL REsPONsIBIL rY which prohibits a lawyer from "[c]onununicat[ing]
or causting] another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer of such other party or is authorized by law to do so.").
Although the Court stated that the rule did not "bear on the constitutional issue"
involved, its quotation of the rule would appear to suggest that, in this context, the
Court views actions of all government agents as equivalent to action by the prosecu-
tion (that is, the government attorney). Thus, if the disciplinary rule were to apply,
the prohibition imposed by the rule on government attorneys would apply equally
to the police. Moreover, though the disciplinary rule by its terms applies only to
situations in which the defendant is represented by counsel, the Court has apparently
[Vol 129:994
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Such a prohibition is consistent with the purposes of the sixth
amendment. The Court's sixth amendment decisions are premised
on the assumption that, at least with respect to government efforts
to elicit incriminating statements, the defendant is entitled to sub-
stantially the same type of protection he would have at trial.5 As
Kamisar's "Gatehouses" essay points out,55 no one would dream of
suggesting that the prosecuting attorney could question the defend-
ant at trial in the absence of his attorney. Once the defendant's
sixth amendment right attaches, therefore, at least in the absence
of a valid waiver of the right, the government should be precluded
from all efforts to elicit incriminating statements in the absence
of counsel.
The issue of waiver also merits further consideration. As
Kamisar suggested in his "Gatehouses" essay, if the defendant's
fifth or sixth amendment rights are easily waived, then the rights are
of relatively little value.56 In Miranda, the Court articulated a high
standard of waiver, holding that the strict Johnson v. Zerbst 57
"'standards of proof" are applicable 6 8 and suggesting that, in order
to sustain its burden of proof on this issue, the government might
be required to adduce specific types of evidence. 9
Nevertheless, in practice, the police have had little difficulty in
establishing waiver of Miranda rights.6 0 Moreover, the Court has
evidenced a strong inclination towards weakening, rather than
strengthening, the standards of waiver articulated by the Warren
Court.6 Most significantly, perhaps, Justice White in his Williams
made it clear that the defendant's sixth amendment right will be implicated in
situations in which the defendant is not represented by counsel. See Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99 (dictum). Thus, if the disciplinary rule is intended to
sketch the possible boundaries of the defendant's sixth amendment right, the rule
cannot be limited to situations in which the defendant is actually represented by
counsel.
54 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 494 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (once
"adversary proceedings have commenced, . . . the constitutional guarantees attach
which pertain to a criminal trial"; included among these is "the guarantee of the
assistance of counsel"). See generally Grano, supra note 41, at 20.
55 y. KAmISAR, supra note 1, at 28-29.
B6 Id, 38.
57304 U.S. 458 (1938).
58 384 U.S. at 475.
59 Id.
1o See generally Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in
Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MrcH. L. Rv. 1347
(1968); Project Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YAME
L.J. 1519 (1967).
61 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding an express
written or oral statement of waiver of Miranda rights not a prerequisite to a valid
waiver).
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dissent62 expressed the view that the waiver issue turns exclusively
on whether the defendant is aware of his constitutional rights at
the time he makes an incriminating statement.6 3 Acceptance of
this view, of course, would mean that so long as police warn the
defendant of his constitutional rights, they will be free to try to
elicit incriminating statements; that the defendant asserts his right
to remain silent need not stop the police interrogation, 4 though
it may slow it.6 If the defendant divulges incriminating statements
in response to police interrogation efforts, he will be doing so with
awareness of his constitutional rights and, therefore, in the absence
of visibly coercive circumstances (such as repeated rounds of inter-
rogation), he will be deemed to have waived those rights.
The above view of waiver, which was narrowly rejected by
the Court in Williams, 66 might have been resurrected in Henry
when the Court asserted that the case before it involved no waiver
because the defendant was "unaware that [the informer] was an
undercover agent exressly commissioned to secure evidence." 67
Although it would be unduly speculative to draw negative impli-
cations from so brief a discussion, the Court's articulated basis for
rejecting a finding of waiver in Henry at least leaves open the pos-
sibility that it will accept a modified version of Justice White's
view of waiver. The argument would run that when a defendant
who has been warned of his constitutional rights knows that he is
dealing with an agent of the government, his voluntary (that is
not induced by threats or other forms of undue pressure) disclosure
of incriminating information to the agent constitutes a waiver
because the defendant has incriminated himself with knowledge
that he has a right to refrain from doing so.
From the perspective of safeguarding individual rights, adop-
tion of this position would be disastrous. First, Justice White's
62430 U.S. at 429 (White, J., dissenting). justice White's dissent was explicitly
joined by two other justices and at least implicitly by the fourth dissenting justice.
See id. 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
63 Id. 433-36 (White, J., dissenting).
64 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 111 (1975) (White, J., concurring)
("no reason . . . to rob the accused of the choice to answer questions voluntarily
for some unspecified period of time following his own previous contrary decision").
65 Id. 111 ("'repeated rounds' of questioning following an assertion of the
privilege would [under some circumstances] count heavily against the state in a
determination of voluntariness"). For an incisive analysis of the concurring and
majority opinions in Mosley, see Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 S. CT. REv. 99, 134-36.
66 430 U.S. at 404.
67 100 S. Ct. at 2188.
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doctrine of waiver is contrary to the Johnson v. Zerbst 0 8 formula-
tion that "waiver requires not merely comprehension but relin-
quishment," 69 a standard that mandates an express waiver on the
part of the defendant. Second, Justice White's approach negates
the premise underlying the Miranda and Massiah doctrines because
it assumes that a defendant confronted with police interrogation
will be able to take continuing account of a warning given at the
commencement of the interrogation. But this ignores the psycho-
logical realities of a police interrogation. As the Court in Miranda
recognized, and as Kamisar's writings vividly illustrate, 70 an
officer's warning of constitutional rights will likely be obliterated
if, after issuing the warnings, the officer is permitted to use the
standard interrogation techniques designed to elicit incriminating
statements.71
Thus, the Miranda and Massiah protections will be meaningful
only if they are viewed as prohibitions on government conduct.
When Miranda applies, the police should not be permitted to in-
terrogate the suspect; similarly, when Massiah in in effect, they
should not attempt to elicit incriminating statements from him.
If the police violate these principles, the waiver issue is not germane.
The police have violated constitutional restrictions and any result-
ing incriminating statements should be inadmissible.
Undoubtedly, the debate concerning the permissible scope of
police interrogation will continue. As Kamisar's preface suggests,72
when questions of such magnitude and controversy are at stake,
there is never any final outcome. Some issues remain to be de-
cided and others may be subject to reconsideration. In this con-
tinuing debate, it is comforting to know that Professor Kamisar's
voice will continue to be heard and, if past history is any guide, will
continue to have an important effect on the outcome.
08 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
69 See Williams, 430 U.S. at 404. See generally Grano, supra note 41, at 34.
70 See, e.g., Y. KAwms_ , supra note 1, at 1-6.
71 Indeed, as Kamisar notes, in some cases police manuals provide that the
suspect should be informed of his rights in order to increase the effectiveness of the
interrogation technique. He cites the following example: "Joe, you have a right to
remain silent That's your privilege .... But let me ask you this. Suppose you
were in my shoes and I were in yours ... and I told you, 'I don't want to answer
any of your questions.' You'd think I had something to hide.. ." Id. 3 (quoting
F. ImBAu & J. REm, supra note 3, at 111).
72 Id. xx.
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